In Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide, ed. Stevenson, Dewey, and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The Pragmatic Origins of Ethical Expressivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 39: 225–248.īlack, Max. In Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development, ed. Reflections on Language, Truth and Logic. Concerning the Negation of Empirical Propositions. VIII, Historie de la logique et de la philosophie scientifique, 53–59. In Actes du Congrès international de philosophie scientifique, Sorbonne, Paris 1935, facs. The Analytic Movement in Contemporary British Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 14: 173–185. Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 34: 51–62. As can be gleaned from this list, verification was a hot topic in England for many years, even after the Viennese logical empiricists had left it behind, first for confirmation and later for more technical and logical issues.Īyer, Alfred J. 1945) right before the second edition of LTL. Finally, there were two further substantial events, John Wisdom’sĥ0-page essay ( 1938) and another symposium (Mackinnon et al. Verification was the topic of two more technical papers by Morris Lazerowitz’s ( 1937, 1939), Bertrand Russell ( 1937) devoted his presidential address at the Aristotelian Society to verification and Ayer’s friend, Isaiah Berlin ( 1938) also wrote about the topic. Ewing ( 1937) published another paper on verification and meaninglessness, to which Sidgwick ( 1937) replied, followed by Ewing’s ( 1938) counter-reply. Stace’s ( 1935) paper became quite influential, with Ayer ( 1936a) producing a reply immediately after the publication of LTL, which was in turn followed by Alfred Sidgwick’s ( 1936) response. After the publication of LTL, Gilbert Ryle ( 1936) wrote a shorter critical article.

Stace ( 1935) who-in their replies to Ayer ( 1934a)-were critical of some of the details while supporting the intuitive core of the verification idea. 1934), and verification was also at stake for Max Black ( 1934) and for W.T. In 1934, an entire symposium was devoted to questions of verification (Stebbing et al. Before LTL, Margaret MacDonald ( 1934) tried to clarify the issue of verification by pointing out that determining the truth and falsity of a proposition first requires an understanding of the proposition in question (contrary to Schlick’sįamous doctrine that to understand the meaning of a proposition is to indicate the ways in which the proposition will be verified).

Language truth logic